Is there a moral ideal of fidelity to law?
If so, what is its origin? Is it implicit in the notion of "legality" or "law"? What is its relation to other principles that we customarily associate with legality?
Is its applicability conditional on the content of a law, or does it attach based on a law's pedigree?
How does it interact with other moral norms?
Can it be reconciled with legal positivism?
Does it help the conscientious objector at all (either in her personal deliberations or with arguments that she should be exempt from the application of a law), or does it just redescribe her problem?
On Fuller... how interrelated are Fuller's notions of "order" and "good order"? With respect to post-Nazi Germany, he claims that they're separate but related goals that can exist in tension with one another, but that must both be satisfied. And then he simultaneously claims that they at least have "affinity" (or greater affinity than order and bad order) and that they are both to be regarded as goals for lawyers?
If they're separable, is it law's satisfaction of the "morality of order" that gives rise to the duty of fidelity (it's at least necessary, but is it sufficient?), or mustn't it be law's satisfaction of the morality of good order?
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